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I. INTRODUCTION
Since late 1994 Pacific Bell and GTE have told Californians not
to change a thing.' Conversely, AT&T,2 MCI, and Sprint-and less
familiar phone companies such as LDDS and Express Tel-have urged
Californians to break away.3 Meanwhile, twenty-one million tele-
phone users in California4 are left wondering just what it is they
should or should not change.
Unbeknownst to most telephone users, January 1, 1995, marked
the next big step in deregulating California's telecommunications mar-
ket.5 A decade ago Californians gained the ability to select a tele-
phone company to carry their long distance phone calls; today they
face a similar choice when it comes to making local long distance
calls.6 In addition to local phone companies, over ninety long distance
companies will be competing for toll service subscribers.7 As a result,
toll rates will drop an average of thirty-nine percent, becoming among
the lowest rates in the nation.8 After years of exclusive carriage of toll
calls, local exchange carriers (LECs) such as Pacific Bell and GTE are
faced with competition-competition that strikes at an essential source
of their income.9
This Comment explores the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion's (CPUC) approach to opening the toll market to competition.
Part II examines the events leading up to the CPUC's decision. Part
1. GTE's advertisement pictures a flat tire with the caption, "Things You Should
Change," and then pictures "l+The Phone Number" with the caption, "Things You
Shouldn't." E.g., L.A. Timrs, Jan. 17, 1995, at B8.
2. A glossary is included at the end of this Comment for referencing terms.
3. LDDS's advertisement pictures a ball and chain with the caption, "You're Finally
Free To Choose Your Own Long Distance Carrier For Local Toll Calls." E.g., L.A. TiMES,
Dec. 13, 1994, at D6. Express Tel's ad shows three dead fish and asks, "'What's that
smell?'" Denise Gellene, Telephone Companies Hear Call of New Round of Competition,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1994, at D1. Another Express Tel ad pictures a dry cleaners with the
caption, "'You should know this place well. Pacific Bell has been taking you there for
years.'" Id.
4. California Public Utilities Commission, News Release 1 (Sept. 15, 1994) (on file
with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter News Release].
5. See Gellene, supra note 3, at D1.
6. I will refer to local long distance calls as toll calls. Toll calls are telephone calls
beyond a twelve-mile radius within a region. See infra part II.B.1.
7. Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, No. D.94-09-
065, slip op. app. F at F-1 to -3 (Cal. P.U.C. Sept. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Interim Opinion].
8. News Release, supra note 4, at 1.
9. See Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 32; see also A. MICRAEL NOLL, INTRODUC-
TION TO TELEPHONES AND TELEPHONE SYsTEMs 148 (1986) (observing that "[n]early 50 to
60 cents of every dollar in toll revenue was returned to local phone companies," effectively
subsidizing local service).
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III dissects areas of the decision, reviews the approaches taken by
other states, and highlights the potential challenges the CPUC faces.
Part IV forecasts the detrimental impact on residential customers, rec-
ommends the next steps in deregulating this area, and analyzes the
long-term implications of this decision both for the state and the
consumer.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of a Monopoly
The Pacific coast's first telephone arrived in 1877,10 and the first
interconnecting telephone exchange 1 was established in 1878.12 By
the turn of the century, local telephone companies were competing to
provide telephone service throughout the state.1 3 American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) developed a superior long
distance telephone network and gained control of the local competi-
tors by limiting connection of its network to only its own local affili-
ates.' 4 In this way AT&T grew into a single national network,
providing both local and long distance telephone service,' 5 and mono-
polizing telephone traffic in the United States.' 6
10. Pacific Bell, Pacific Bell History and Development 1 (Aug. 1986) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
11. An interconnecting telephone exchange is a central office telephone switch that is
connected to another central office telephone switch. See JOHN BELLAMY, DIGITAL TE-
LEPHONY 5 (1982). The exchange originally comprised the area served by a central office
where the operator-attended switchboard was located. Washington Indep. Tel. Ass'n v.
Telecommunications Ratepayers Ass'n, 880 P.2d 50, 52 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
12. Pacific Bell, supra note 10, at 1. The exchange was established in San Francisco by
the Gold and Stock Telegraph Company, a subsidiary of Western Union. Id
13. See MIcHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 4.2, at
199 (1992); Pacific Bell, supra note 10, at 1-3.
14. KELLOGG Er AL., supra note 13, § 4.2, at 199-200.
15. See GTE Sprint Communications Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 753 P.2d 212,213
(Colo. 1988) (en banc); KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 13, § 42, at 201. AT&T provided
approximately 80% of the nation's local telephone service, while the remaining 20% was
serviced by independent local telephone companies, such as GTE and Central Telephone.
James M. Fink, The Battle over the Rewrite of Illinois' Telecommunications Law: Is More
Reform Needed?, 11 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 189, 192 n.11 (1991) (citing S. REP. No. 41, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991)).
16. E.g., KELLOGG Er AL., supra note 13, § 1.3.5, at 23. By 1982 AT&T was also the
largest corporation in the world. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.
131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). In
1980 the Bell System's total operating revenues exceeded $50 billion which constituted
almost two percent of the gross national product of the United States that year. Id. at 152
n.85. Its net income was $6 billion. Id. Its net assets devoted to telephone service in 1979
were valued at approximately $99.3 billion. Id It employed over one million people by
the end of 1979, making it the largest U.S. employer except for the federal government. Id.
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Twenty-two subsidiaries operated AT&T's regional telephone
networks. 7 Pacific Telephone and Telegraph (Pacific) was the AT&T
regional subsidiary that served a majority of California and intercon-
nected with other AT&T regional networks. 18
Improved technology, falling costs, and a change in national regu-
latory policy in the 1970s allowed telecommunications common carri-
ers such as Sprint, MCI, and Western Union to compete in the
interstate long distance market.19 Still, AT&T subsidiaries retained
exclusive control of the intrastate market.20
In 1974 the United States Department of Justice, responding to
alleged monopolistic practices by AT&T-including unequal access to
the long distance market-filed an antitrust claim." This claim, set-
tled in 1982, resulted in the largest judicially supervised divestiture in
history."'
B. The 1982 Decree
The 1982 court-approved order, referred to as the Modified Final
Judgment (MFJ), divested AT&T of its twenty-two subsidiaries.2 The
MFJ created a new framework of ownership and rate structure by,
among other things, simultaneously creating regional operating com-
panies and dividing the country into local access and transport areas
(LATAs).'
1. MFJ creates LATAs
The MFJ directed the Regional Bell Operating Companies
(RBOCs) to divide their territories into new geographical classifica-
tions known as LATAs3P LATA boundaries distinguish local and toll
17. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 642, 401 P.2d 353,
357, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1965).
18. Id at 643,401 P.2d at 358,44 Cal. Rptr. at 6. By 1981 Pacific ranked second among
all Bell companies in terms of total telephones in service and gain in the number of cus-
tomer access lines; it generated one billion more long distance calls than the next highest
Bell company and operated in 53 of California's 58 counties. Pacific Bell, supra note 10, at
5.
19. GTE Sprint, 753 P.2d at 213.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 214. AT&T allegedly also used profits derived from its monopoly telephone
operations to subsidize the long distance and equipment markets-businesses in which
AT&T faced competition. American TeL & TeL Co., .552 F. Supp. at 223.
22. KELLOGG ELT AL., supra note 13, § 4.5, at 218.
23. American TeL & TeL Co., 552 F. Supp. at 226.
24. KELLOGG Er A.., supra note 13, § 4.18, at 227.
25. GTE Sprint, 753 P.2d at 214.
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calls from long distance calls.26 LATA boundaries also determine if a
long distance carrier, such as MCI or AT&T, can carry the call, or
whether a local exchange carrier (LEC), such as Pacific Bell or GTE,
can complete the call alone.27
The MFJ envisioned LATAs as areas composed of one or more
contiguous local exchanges that serve "common social, economic, and
other purposes."' MFJ guidelines allowed LATAs to transcend mu-
nicipal or other local government boundaries, but prohibited them
from extending beyond state borders or encompassing more than one
metropolitan area.29 The composition of some LATAs was subject to
judicial approval, allowing some deviations from the MFJ
restrictions.30
The original AT&T territory was divided into 163 LATAs.31
These LATAs ranged in size from 10,000 to 10 million people,32 with
an average of 500,000 people in each LATA.33 California is composed
of eleven LATAs. 4
Table 1 displays the LATA division within California.
The creation of LATA boundaries was, therefore, not intended
to delineate between local calls and toll calls.35 Rather, the imposition
of toll charges for intraLATA calls is a decision reserved to state regu-
latory bodies and not specified in the MEFJ.
3 6
California has defined a toll call as any intraLATA call beyond a
twelve-mile37 radius.38 For instance, calls between San Clemente and
Thousand Oaks, or between San Diego and Oceanside, are in-
traLATA toll calls because they travel further than twelve miles but
stay within a LATA. On the other hand, calls between Thousand
Oaks and San Diego, or between Oceanside and San Clemente, are
26. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 994 (D.D.C. 1983).
27. Id.
28. American Tel. & TeL Co., 552 F. Supp. at 229.
29. ld.
30. KELLOGG Er AL., supra note 13, § 4.8, at 230-32.
31. ld. § 4.8, at 234.
32. This number exceeds the number of subscribers of phone systems in Switzerland or
Belgium. Id. § 5.3.3, at 264.
33. Id. § 4.8, at 234.
34. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, app. B at B-9; Pacific Bell, supra note 10, at 6.
35. KELLOGG ET hA.., supra note 13, § 4.8, at 227.
36. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. at 995.
37. In some areas the radius is 16 miles. News Release, supra note 4, at 1.
38. See Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 4. California defines local calls, also referred
to as local usage, local measured usage, or measured usage, as "calls completed to central
[switching] offices within 12 miles of the caller's central [switching] office." Id. at 25.
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Table 1 - California LATA Map
0
Butte City
Chico
Redding
Yreka
San Luis Obispo
Santa Barbara
Santa Maria
Palm
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interLATA long distance calls because the calls cross a LATA
boundary.
2. MFJ divests AT&T
The MFJ ordered AT&T to transfer ownership of the subsidiaries
to new entities.3 9 AT&T subsequently formed seven wholly in-
dependent regional holding companies, the Regional Bell Operating
Companies (RBOCs), to provide for all calls carried over the local
exchange.40 The Pacific Telesis Group was one such RBOC.
41
The MFJ allowed the RBOCs to retain a monopoly over local
telephone services, but it precluded the RBOCs from providing any
long distance services.42 Thus, the RBOCs can carry intraLATA traf-
fic-calls originating and terminating within the same LATA 3-but
not interLATA traffic-calls that pass from LATA to LATA. So, the
MFJ allows Pacific Bell to carry calls between Los Angeles and San
Clemente, or between San Diego and Oceanside, but prohibits it from
carrying calls between Orange County and Oceanside. These in-
terLATA calls are handled instead by a long distance or Inter-Ex-
change Carrier (IXC).4
C. IntraLATA Controversy After the 1982 Decree
The MFJ was clear in its intent not to invade state control over
competition in local or toll service.45 Yet shortly after the MFJ was
issued, Judge Harold Greene, who presided over AT&T's divestment,
stated that toll market competition was always contemplated, 6 and
the service was never intended to be reserved to the local carriers.47
39. American TeL & TeL Co., 552 F. Supp. at 226.
40. KELLOGG Er AL., supra note 13, § 4.7, at 223-24. The local exchange is the collec-
tion of access lines that connect customers with a switching machine that serves a neighbor-
hood. See NOLL, supra note 9, at 77; J. GORDON PEARcE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SwrrcHING 1 (1981).
41. Pacific Telesis is the parent company of Pacific Bell. Interim Opinion, supra note 7,
app. B at B-11; Pacific Bell, supra note 10, at 5.
42. American TeL & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 224, 227-28.
43. Id. at 228. IntraLATA calls include local as well as toll calls.
44. See id. at 227. Common IXCs are AT&T, Sprint, and MCI. Alexander C. Larson
& Douglas R. Mudd, Collocation and Telecommunications Policy: A Fostering of Competi-
tion on the Merits?, 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 263, 265 n.5 (1992).
45. American TeL & TeL Co., 552 F. Supp. at 159 n.117.
46. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 1005 n.72 (D.D.C. 1983).
47. Id. at 1005.
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Despite Judge Greene's statement most states did not rush to em-
brace intraLATA competition.48 By 1986 only sixteen states had de-
cided to allow intraLATA toll competition. 49
Nevertheless, the court in United States v. Western Electric Co.
5 0
carried out Judge Greene's intent to allow toll competition and issued
an order that compelled RBOCs to provide equal access to competi-
tors for carriage of intraLATA and interLATA calls unless a state
regulatory agency "affirmatively prohibited"5' the granting of such ac-
cess. Accordingly, in June 1984, California expressly declined to
adopt intraLATA competition.5 2
D. Rise and Power of the State Public Utilities Commission
Prior to the Communications Act of 1934,53 telecommunications
regulation was relatively minimal and considered ineffective. 4 The
Act established a dual regulatory system,5 5 creating the Federal Com-
munications Commission to regulate interstate and foreign communi-
cations5 6 while expressly reserving to the states the regulation of
intrastate communications.57 In Louisiana Public Service Commission
v. FCC,58 the Supreme Court acknowledged the natural strain be-
tween federal and state regulation under this structure,59 and reaf-
firmed the state's sovereign power to regulate communications within
its borders.60
Prior to the MFJ, the smallest geographic unit of measurement
for regulatory purposes was a state,61 and the states retained regula-
tory control over communication activities within that unit of mea-
surement. 6z The smallest unit of regulatory measurement following
48. See Margie Semilof, IntraLATA Competition: LATA Barrier Falls, NETWORK
WORLD, Aug. 25, 1986, at 11, 11.
49. Id
50. 569 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1983).
51. Id. at 1006 n.74.
52. Competition in the Provision of Telecommunications Transmission Serv., 15
C.P.U.C.2d 426, 458, 476 (1984).
53. Ch. 652,48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1988)).
54. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.2-.6, at 78-84.
55. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 (1986).
56. 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a), 201(a) (1988).
57. Id. §§ 152(b), 221(b).
58. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
59. I& at 375.
60. Id at 370.
61. GTE Sprint Communications Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 753 P.2d 212, 213
(Colo. 1988) (en banc).
62. See 47 U.S.C. § 152 (1988); GTE Sprint, 753 P.2d at 213.
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the MFJ is a LATA, and a state's power extends to all LATAs situated
within its boundaries. 63
E. Making IntraLATA Telephone Calls
To understand the issues confronting the deregulation of the in-
traLATA market, it is important to understand the physical acts in-
volved in making a phone call. To clarify the concepts, I will use Table
2 in conjunction with a hypothetical phone call from you in Thousand
Oaks to your mother in San Clemente.
Generally speaking, a customer's call is carried across wires from
the customer's telephone to the LEC's central switch.64 This is shown
by the lines between your house in Thousand Oaks and GTE's end
office switching station. At the LEC's central switch, the call is
handed off for interexchange transport to the destination party's cen-
tral switch, where it is then transmitted to the destination party's
telephone.65
For intraLATA toll calls this process differs slightly, depending
on whether the interexchange transport is done by the LEC or by an
IXC.6 6 Table 2 shows an example of GTE, the LEC, and of MCI, the
IXC, carrying the call from GTE's end office switching station to Pa-
cific Bell's end office switching station. Also, recall that -the call to
Mom is a toll call because Thousand Oaks and San Clemente are
more than twelve miles apart, and the call stays within, but does not
cross, LATA boundaries.67
IntraLATA calls carried by an LEC travel across the local loop to
the LEC's end office that serves that particular customer.68 Again,
these are the lines between you in Thousand Oaks, and GTE's end
office switching station. The call is carried over the LEC's own inter-
exchange facilities to the LEC's end office switching station serving
the destination party.69 This is the solid line between GTE's end of-
63. See GTE Sprint, 753 P.2d at 214.
64. NOLL, supra note 9, at 146. The two wires between the telephone user and the
LEC's office form the local loop. Id at 12.
65. See id. at 147; Craig D. Dingwall, Imputation of Access Charges-A Prerequisite for
Effective IntraLATA Toll Competition, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 433, 435 (1988).
66. Dingwall, supra note 65, at 435.
67. See supra part II.B.1.
68. Dingwall, supra note 65, at 435.
69. Id. "Large volumes of traffic between points are generally routed over direct
trunks, while small volumes of traffic are usually switched from a central point... [in what
is] known as a 'tandem' arrangement. Tandeming is used because it is more economical
than direct trunking for small volumes of toll traffic." Competition in the Provision of
Telecommunications Transmission Serv., 15 C.P.U.C.2d 426, 433 (1984). Tandem offices
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fice switching station and that of Pacific Bell's end office switching
station. After the call is handed to the destination LEC's end office,
the call travels over the local loop to the destination party's tele-
phone.70 These are the lines between Pacific Bell's end office switch-
ing station and Mom in San Clemente.
In a deregulated market IXCs complete intraLATA calls in a sim-
ilar fashion.7 ' The customer's call travels over the LEC's local loop to
the LEC's end office switch.72 Once more, these are the lines between
you in Thousand Oaks and GTE's end office switching station. At this
point, rather than handing the call to its own interexchange facilities,
the LEC's end office switch sends the call to the customer-designated
IXC,73 such as AT&T or MCI. In California the customer determines
which IXC would carry the call by dialing 10XXX. In our hypotheti-
cal, because you chose MCI by dialing 10222,14 GTE's end office
switch sends the call to MCI's point of presence.
The IXC carries the call across its own interexchange lines to its
facility closest to the LEC's end office serving the destination party.75
In Table 2 MCI carries the call from its point of presence in Thousand
Oaks to its point of presence in San Clemente. The call is then
handed to the local destination LEC and carried across its local loop
to the intended caller.76 MCI sends the call from its point of presence
in San Clemente to Pacific Bell's local end office switching station,
and Pacific Bell completes the call by delivering it to your eagerly
awaiting Mom.
Whenever a call is handed off from the originating LEC's end
office switch to an IXC-whether for long distance calls or in-
traLATA toll calls-the LEC imposes an access charge on the IXC.
The practice of charging for access dates back to Smith v. Illinois Bell
Telephone Co. ,7 when the Supreme Court determined that interstate
consumers would offset the expenditures of plant operation costs. As
interconnect the central offices within an exchange that have insufficient interoffice traffic
volume to justify the installation of a direct trunk. BELLAMY, supra note 11, at 8.
70. Dingwall, supra note 65, at 435.
71. See id.
72. Id End office switching is also referred to as local switching. Interim Opinion,
supra note 7, at 114.
73. The IXC's physical location is referred to as its point of presence. See Interim
Opinion, supra note 7, app. B at B-11.
74. PACInIc BELL, WE'RE CHANGING OUR PRICES § 5 (1994) (on file with Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter WE'RE CHANGING OUR PRICES].
75. Dingwall, supra note 65, at 435.
76. Id.
77. 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
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part of the divestment, the MFJ established a system of access charges
which are applied to IXCs for interconnecting with LECs.78
California access charges generally consist of fees for (1) the
LEC's switching function done at the end office that supports the user
("end office switching"),79 (2) transmitting a call from the LEC's end
office to the IXC's point of presence ("local transport"), 80 and (3)
costs of the access to the LEC's network ("carrier common line
charge" (CCLC)).
F. Reasons to Allow IntraLATA Competition
Since divestment, regulators across the country have imple-
mented intraLATA competition or are considering plans to do so.'
The determinations as to when and how to deregulate the intraLATA
market have been varied,83 but the motivation as to why has been
consistent.
LATA boundaries limit competition' by prohibiting carriers
other than LECs to carry traffic within the LATA.85 Supporters of a
deregulated market assert that the costs of regulation exceed the ben-
efits.86 Deregulation increases society's welfare and abandons mo-
nopolistic environments where "the market and not the state public
service commission dictates the price of a service."8 8 Deregulation
creates intangible benefits such as lower prices, increased perform-
78. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, app. B at 232-34
(D.D.C. 1982).
79. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 114.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See infra part III.B.
83. See infra part IlI.B.
84. Joseph Gillan, Consumer Sovereignty: A Proposed Approach to IntraLATA Com-
petition, PuB. UTiL. FORT., Aug. 16, 1990, at 34, 34.
85. See id. at 34-35.
86. See David Gabel, Deregulation: Should the Local Telephone Market Be Next?, 24
NEw ENG. L. REv. 39, 58-59 (1989). For a discussion of the concerns in opening up local
service to competition, see id.
87. See id.
88. Fink, supra note 15, at 194. "Regulation necessarily fosters a battle of wits between
regulators seeking to impose restraints and regulated companies trying to avoid them."
Competition in the Provision of Telecommunications Transmission Serv., 15 C.P.U.C.2d
426, 437 (1984).
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ance incentive," experimentation, innovation,9" and rapid deployment
of new technology.91
State regulators have also considered opening the intraLATA
market because competition limitations have affected the way the
consumer views the toll and long distance price structure. 92 To the
phone user, the boundaries between local, toll, and long distance calls
seem arbitrary.93 This perceived arbitrariness alters consumer accept-
ance of telecommunications services94 and may influence the degree
that the consumer utilizes them. Thus, regulators have recognized
that instead of structuring the market "to promote producer respon-
siveness to consumer demand,"95 LATA boundaries inhibit respon-
siveness to consumer demand, consumer needs, and consumer
preferences.96
The increasing difficulty of enforcing the ban on intraLATA com-
petition also affected the CPUC's decision to open the intraLATA
market.97 Sophisticated telephone users have an increasing ability to
use advances in technology to bypass the local loop and avoid the
LECs' related costs for making toll calls.98 At the same time, LECs
have a diminishing ability to block toll calls in light of the increasing
development of special services-notably 800-tol-free calls and Wide
Area Telephone Service9 9-offered by competitors. 100 The CPUC's
decision to open the market was an acknowledgment that, left unad-
dressed, LECs' loss of revenue would grow.
89. "In a competitive market, firms devote resources to outsmarting their adversa-
ries-other firms." Telecommunications Transmission Serv., 15 C.P.U.C.2d at 438.
90. Gabel, supra note 86, at 39 (citing NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICA7IONS AND INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NTIA REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES REPORT 68
(1987)); Gillan, supra note 84, at 35.
91. State OKs IntraLATA Facilities-Based Toll Competition, PuB. UTIL. FORT., May 10,
1990, at 47,47. "[Cjompetitive firms are much more likely to invent or adapt new technol-
ogies to maximize their cost advantages and increase their market." Telecommunications
Transmission Serv., 15 C.P.U.C.2d at 436.
92. See Gillan, supra note 84, at 34.
93. See id
94. Id at 34-35.
95. Id at 35.
96. Id Several petitions have been filed with the CPUC to redraw LATA boundaries
because they allegedly bisect communities of interest which may not be conterminous with
state lines. Interim Opinion, supra, note 7, at 152-53.
97. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 11.
98. Id
99. Wide Area Telephone Service is more commonly referred to as WATS. Id.
100. Id
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G. Federal Telecom Reform
In 1994 three bills were introduced in Congress that proposed
sweeping reform to federal telecommunications regulation. 10 1 These
bills endeavored to overhaul the 1934 Communications Act' 2 and
provide greater consistency to the divergent communications policies
of the states.103 IntraLATA deregulation was among the many issues
confronted in the bills;1°4 however, Congress failed to pass all three
bills.' While the House bills were overwhelmingly approved,0 6 the
Senate version never reached the floor for a vote0 7 despite broad ap-
proval by the Commerce Committee. 08 Failed federal efforts to act in
this area leave the states with the responsibility of reforming telecom-
munications regulation.
H. California Public Utilities Commission
1. History
Prior to 1911 the California legislature and the State Board of
Transportation Commissioners regulated public utilities in Califor-
nia.10 9 In 1911 the foundations for utility regulation emerged with the
adoption of three constitutional amendments." 0 One of those legisla-
101. S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R.
3636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), referred to as the Hollings Bill, the Brooks-Dingell Bill,
and the Markey-Fields Bill, respectively. Nicholas W. Allard, Congress Paves a New Road,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 7, 1994, at 29, 30.
102. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1988));
Allard, supra note 101, at 29, 30.
103. See Leslie Helm, No Telecom Bill Means States, Courts Must Sort Out Issues, L.A.
TimEs, Sept. 27, 1994, at Dl, D4.
104. See id. at D4.
105. See id. at Dl.
106. The Brooks-Dingell Bill was approved 423 to 5. William J. Eaton & Leslie Helm,
House Rewrites Phone, Cable Rules, L.A. TIMEs, June 29, 1994, at Al, A18. The Markey-
Fields Bill was approved 423 to 4. Id.
107. Helen Dewar, Senate Stalemate Kills Campaign Reform Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
1994, at Al. The 104th Congress has targeted telecommunications reform as one of its
objectives; competing factions, however, have been unable to agree as to how to accom-
plish it. See Jube Shiver Jr., No GOP Quick Fix Seen on Telecom Bill, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1995, at D3. Again, intraLATA service is among many issues implicated. Pressler Releases
Telecom "Discussion Draft"; VDT Applicants Would Undergo One-Year Freeze, TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS REP., Feb. 6, 1995, at 1, 2.
108. See Jube Shiver Jr., Senate Panel Approves Broad Reform Bill, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
12, 1994, at D2.
109. See CLYDE C. BAKER, THE CALIFORNIA PUBmIC UTILIms COMMISSION: AN OR-
GANIZATIONAL PROFILE 1-2 (1966). During this period railroads were the primary focus of
regulation. Id.
110. See id. at 4.
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tive acts was the Public Utilities Act of 1911"'1 which created the Rail-
road Commission," 2 the predecessor of the CPUC." 3 The Act gave
the Railroad Commission the power to regulate public utilities and to
establish rates.'
1 4
2. CPUC guidelines and objectives
Since the AT&T divestment, the CPUC has defined its function
as managing the transition of telecommunications from a monopoly to
a competitive telecommunications market." 5 In fulfilling this role,
the CPUC adopted the "New Regulatory Framework" which provides
an incentive environment for the growing number of alternatives to
LEC services." 6
The New Regulatory Framework separated telephone services
into three categories: Category I services are "monopoly services for
which no competition is authorized";"' Category II services are "dis-
cretionary or partially competitive services for which competition is
authorized, with pricing flexibility between appropriate price ceilings
and price floors";"" Category III services are "fully competitive tele-
communications services with full pricing flexibility and minimal tariff
requirements.""' 9
These categories form the regulatory framework for the CPUC's
pricing policies. 21 Prices for Category I services are "cost-based" and
should equal the direct embedded costs (DEC)12 1 for those specific
services."2 For Category II services, the CPUC authorizes downward
price flexibility capped at rates that it found reasonable.'2 The price
111. Ch. 91, 1915 Cal. Stat. 115 (original version at ch. 20, 1911 Cal. Stat. 13).
112. I1.
113. BAKER, supra note 109, at 3. The Railroad Commission was renamed the Public
Utilities Commission by amendment, adopted on November 5,1946. CAL. CONST. art. XII,
§ 22 (current version at CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-9 (amended 1974)).
114. See CAL. CONST. art. XII (amended 1974); REP. oF THE RAILROAD COMM'N OF
CALIFORNIA FROM JANUARY 1, 1911 TO JUNE 30, 1912, 19 (1912).
115. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 10.
116. Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 33 C.P.U.C.2d
43, 59 (1989).
117. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 2.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Direct embedded costs are the "[hlistorical costs of a utility that can be attributed
to a specific service on the basis of direct cost causation, based on the utility's incurred
costs as reflected on the accounting records of the company." Id. app. B at B-6.
122. See id. at 32-33.
123. Id. at 33.
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cap accompanies a price floor, which prevents subsidization and an-
ticompetitive predatory pricing. 24 As a general guideline, the price
cap is the LEC's proposed rate, while the price floor is the DEC or
long-run incremental cost, whichever is lower."2
The CPUC seeks to accomplish revenue neutrality by offsetting
any revenue increase or decrease by a countervailing change or ad-
justment. The CPUC's goal with revenue neutrality is that the overall
revenue effect is zero. 26
Moreover, universal service has long been a cornerstone of tele-
communications regulation 27 with the CPUC seeking to implement
policies that promote phone usage. 28 The CPUC believes that every
home should have access to emergency services such as fire and po-
lice.' 29 In a broader sense, the CPUC also recognizes that the benefits
of a telephone network stem from its ability to contact others, and
that with each new subscriber the entire network benefits by the in-
creased economic and social activity conducted over that line.' 30 To
serve both of these policies, the CPUC has established a goal of a 95%
telephone service penetration in California households.' 31
3. IntraLATA deregulation in California
In 1984 the CPUC expressly declined to adopt intraLATA com-
petition. 32 At that time its overriding concern was the threat that
deregulation posed to its goals of "availability of telephone service at
affordable rates.' 33 However, the CPUC left open the possibility of
revisiting the decision when "the post-divestiture era turns dawn to
124. Id.
125. Id. at 33-34.
126. Id. at 3.
127. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988); A.B. No. 3643, ch. 278, 1994 Cal. Stat.
128. In addition the California legislature has mandated that the CPUC file a report of
findings and recommendations on the issue of universal service by January 1, 1996. Pacific
Telesis Files Motion for InterLATA Relief; California Cranks Up Effort for Competition by
1997, TELECOMMUNICATIONS RFP., Feb. 6, 1995, at 9, 11 [hereinafter InterLATA Relief].
129. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 445.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 6.
132. Competition in the Provision of Telecommunications Transmission Serv., 15
C.P.U.C.2d 426, 458, 476 (1984).
133. Id. at 452.
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daylight."' 3 The CPUC considered petitions to allow IXCs in-
traLATA carriage, but did not adopt these petitions over the years.135
By September 1991, however, the CPUC had initiated an investi-
gation into the opening of the intraLATA market. 36 On September
17, 1993, the CPUC passed the Implementation Rate Design which
approved intraLATA competition along with the largest increases
ever in basic telephone rates for California. 137 Nevertheless, this deci-
sion was rescinded on October 6, 1993, as a result of an investigation
which determined that the CPUC's decision was "'tainted.' ",138 Util-
ity employees allegedly reviewed and edited the decision and engaged
in several unreported communications with a CPUC official. 39
In light of these improprieties, the CPUC undertook sweeping
review of the decision-making process and instituted corrective meas-
ures. 140 The decision was redrafted with great care, reviewing every
element of the rescinded decision and incorporating additional com-
ments.141 The CPUC distributed a draft for public comment in July
1994, and issued the final decision on September 15, 1994.142
4. Decision summary
The 1994 CPUC opinion extends beyond the mere ordering
of intraLATA toll competition. The opinion touches on a wide area of
telecommunications concerns such as pay telephones, 43 foreign ex-
134. Id at 459.
135. See, eg., Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 41
C.P.U.C.2d 1 (1991); Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 37
C.P.U.C.2d 226 (1990).
136. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 15.
137. Improprieties in the California Public Utilities Commission's Telephone Rate Deci-
sion: Restoring the Public Trust Joint Interim Hearing of the Assembly Comm. on Util and
Com. Comm'n and the Senate Comm. on Energy and Pub. UtiL at v (1993).
138. Id at vii (quoting CPUC investigation report).
139. ld Pacific Bell managers held 34 meetings with CPUC decision makers prior to
the September 17 vote. Id. Key personnel, including Pacific Bell's chief policy witness,
were in the CPUC offices, suggesting policy and editorial changes. The CPUC's own inves-
tigation determined that four chapters of the decision had been "'tainted.'" Id. at vii-viii
(quoting CPUC investigation report).
140. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 15-17.
141. See id. at 16-17.
142. Id at 18.
143. Id at 175-88.
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change services,"' small and midsized LECs, 145 and Centrex/Cen-
traNet and private branch exchange services. 46 Each of these
concerns are affected by intraLATA deregulation. 47
The foundation of the CPUC decision is to reclassify intraLATA
toll carriage as a Category II service4-discretionary or partially
competitive service. 14 9 This reclassification allows telephone carriers
other than the LEC to handle toll calls. It still prevents LECs, how-
ever, from competing against other LECs for intraLATA services. 5 '
For instance, GTE cannot offer toll call carriage within an area ser-
viced by Pacific Bell and vice versa, but MCI or Sprint will be able to
compete against Pacific Bell.
Furthermore, the CPUC moved away from tariffs as a means of
setting terms and conditions for intraLATA toll calls.' 5 ' Instead, the
CPUC has approved the ability for LECs to enter into contracts. 5 2
The CPUC also granted the LECs' request to raise rates for pro-
viding basic service.5 3 Previously, LECs received substantial revenue
from the intraLATA market.15  Toll rates are higher than nontoll calls
for similar mileage, which supports the notion that the toll rates ex-
ceed the cost of providing the service. 5 5 The revenue from toll calls
was used routinely to subsidize LECs in providing below-cost, basic
144. Id. at 71-80. Foreign Exchange Service allows customers in "[e]xchange 'A,'... to
have a telephone number associated with [e]xchange 'B' [which] allows a customer to have
a telephone number presence in a community other than the one where the customer
equipment is physically located. The customer receives dial tone from the foreign ex-
change so that calls to and from other exchanges in [e]xchange B are local calls instead of
toll calls." Id. at 71.
145. Id. at 244-71.
146. Id. at 190-203. These services are designed for businesses with multiple telephone
stations and allow station-to-station calls within the business, as well as providing outside
callers access to a particular station directly. Id. at 190.
147. This Comment, however, will not address all of the areas encompassed in the
CPUC decision.
148. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 23, 335-36.
149. Id at 2. For a description of Category II services, see supra text accompanying
notes 118-25.
150. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 24.
151. See id. at 226-27.
152. Id. at 226.
153. Id. at 38. Phone service requires a cstomer to subscribe to the LEC's basic ex-
change access service. Id. at 39. Basic service comes in two forms, flat rate and measured
rate basis. Ic.
154. For example, approximately 44% of GTE's revenues are collected through toll
calls. Id. at 40. In comparison, GTE receives 32% through rates for local phone service,
and 7% from switched and special access rates. Id.
155. Id. at 32.
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residential service. 156 Now, as toll rates drop with deregulation,
LECs' revenues are expected to decline.' 57 Therefore, the CPUC
has compensated LECs for their anticipated loss in revenue by al-
lowing them to increase basic service rates.58 Thus it achieves reve-
nue neutrality.
Opening the toll market allows consumers to choose which car-
rier will transport the call. The CPUC decided to have all toll calls
carried by the customer's LEC unless the customer specifically directs
the call to a different carrier. 59 'This method, referred to as 1OXXX
dialing, 160 requires customers to dial a five-digit prefix prior to the
destination party's phone number.' 61 The CPUC chose not to imple-
ment customer presubscription 62 which allows a telephone subscriber
to designate in advance which carrier will carry all of a type of call,
such as intraLATA calls, placed on that phone line. 63
The CPUC decision also changed the structure of access charges
that LECs could charge IXCs.' 64 Fees for accessing the LECs' net-
work, carrier common line charges (CCLCs), were eliminated.165 Be-
cause this change was anticipated to affect LECs' revenue, the CPUC
decided to compensate them by;allowing increased charges in other
services. 66
III. ANALYSIS
A. Reviewing the Decision
The decision to introduce intraLATA competition in California
affected several different areas of telephone service. The following
discussion explores some of the areas affected by this decision and the
arguments presented by the various parties.
156. Itd at 40.
157. Id at 32.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 9.
160. See id
161. Id at 9, 26. The prefix will be 1OXXX and each carrier will have a unique three-
digit code represented here as XXX. Id app. B at B-1.
162. Id at 25.
163. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 13, glossary at 861. California offers presubscription
for designating a long distance carrier.
164. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 120-21.
165. Id
166. Id at 121.
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1. Toll rates
Deregulation of the intraLATA toll market has allowed LECs to
lower their toll call rates. 67 It also permitted IXCs to carry in-
traLATA traffic. 168 This partially competitive market has forced the
dominant carriers, like Pacific Bell and GTE, to lower their toll
rates.169 Simultaneously, competitors seeking to capture the LECS'
market share are offering toll rates lower than the LECs'. 170 Table 3
compares Pacific Bell's prior rate, its current rate, and some compet-
ing carriers' rates.
The CPUC also authorized Pacific Bell to implement different
pricing tariffs for business and residential customers.17  Pacific Bell
believed that the different schedules would allow it greater flexibility
in reacting to the competitive forces in the toll market. 7 z Further-
more, it asserted that it should not be saddled with a restriction that
did not bind other carriers.1
7 3
However, separate tariffs may benefit business customers at the
expense of residential customers. 174 Toll service providers may gener-
ally offer lower rates to compete for the lucrative business market
while forsaking any lower prices for residential customers. 75 Instead,
any discounts offered to the business market should be extended to
the residential market. 76
The CPUC rationalized its decision by noting that "[t]he trend in
telecommunications is to cater to and design services for niche mar-
kets and for customers with special calling patterns or needs.' 77 The
CPUC believed that the competitive market will motivate telecommu-
nications companies to design pricing schedules tailored to the cus-
tomer and to create lower prices and increased choicesY.
7 8
167. See id at 134.
168. I& at 23, 335-36.
169. Id. at 134.
170. Id
171. Id at 136. GTE was not granted a separate schedule because it did not request
one, but the CPUC declared that it will allow GTE to file a similar tariff structure in the
future. Id
172. Id. at 135.
173. Id
174. Id
175. ld at 135.
176. See id at 130.
177. I& at 136.
178. Id.
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Table 3- IntraLATAToll Rate Comparison
PcfcBl oejn1) $0.57 $0.84 $1.02
W- f SM- $0.36 $0.40 $0.42
$0.34 $0.37 $0.37
$0.30 $0.33 $0.33
$0.38 $0.41 $0.43
$0.20 $0.20 $0.20
$0.21 $0.21 $0.21
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Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) opposed any reduc-
tion in intraLATA toll rates.179 Moreover, even if a reduction is ap-
proved, TURN believed it should be severely limited.180 TURN
argued that Pacific Bell wrongly assumed that current toll rates are
above cost181 and that Pacific Bell is not subsidizing local service from
toll revenues.'82 Furthermore, even with a competitive intraLATA
market, TURN reasoned that Pacific Bell and GTE will retain an
overwhelming market share as long as customers cannot presubscribe
to their carrier of choice for intraLATA service. 83 Consequently, Pa-
cific Bell and GTE should be held to their current toll rates.
The CPUC also decided to allow LECs to enter into contracts
with customers, rather than relying exclusively on tariffs to set the
rules, terms and conditions of a service.184 The introduction of tariffs
arose in response to allegations of discrimination and preference by
monopoly utilities. 85 It was a way to ensure uniform applicability to a
defined customer class.
186
Carriers submit tariffs to the CPUC that are publicly available."s
The CPUC has permitted exceptions from the tariff structure when
utilities have been confronted with competition for a historically mo-
nopolistic service.188 The CPUC recognized that customers with unu-
sual service requirements, options, or bargaining power will want to
negotiate a more favorable rate or a customized service not specified
by the tariff rate structure.18
9
In a competitive toll market, telecommunications companies
need to tailor their services to meet the specific needs of a wide spec-
trum of customers. The CPUC allowed LECs to enter into contracts
with individual customers for Category II services, which include in-
traLATA toll calls; 90 however, these contracts are subject to a price
floor set by the CPUC.19 ' The CPUC also requires public disclosure
179. Id. at 131.
180. Id.
181. Id
182. See id.
183. Id; Memorandum from Toward Utility Rate Normalization 5 (Oct. 5,,1994) (on file
with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Memorandum].
184. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 226.
185. Id
186. Id at 225.
187. Id
188. Id at 226.
189. Id
190. Id at 226-27.
191. Id. at 228-31.
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of contract terms' 92 due to a statutory obligation, 193 as well as a belief
that public availability of contract terms will promote competition and
safeguard against unlawful price discrimination. 94
The benefit of tariffs and the danger of contracts revolve around
the possibility that the utility will show preference or discrimination in
the rates and services it provides. California law requires that no util-
ity grant any person or corporation. any preference or advantage, or
subject them to any prejudice or disadvantage. 95 Furthermore, both
the MFJ 19 6 and a federal statute' 7 prohibit telecommunication carri-
ers from showing any undue preference or any unreasonable discrimi-
nation. The CPUC has declared that it will enforce this policy and
require that contract rates be available to any customer, provided that
the customer is willing to abide by the contract terms and is similarly
situated to the contracted customer. 98 Customers who are similarly
situated must share numerous characteristics, such as volume, calling
patterns, and cost of negotiation. 199
Since divestment, however, federal courts have been reluctant to
find cases of discrimination or preference in telecommunications serv-
ices.200 Even upon a finding of price discrimination, the courts have
upheld rate schemes based on the theory of "competitive necessity"-
the theory that the carrier's goal is to match the competitor's offered
rate.201 The CPUC acknowledges that it will be difficult for a cus-
tomer to raise a claim of discrimination or preference.2°2 Moreover,
the CPUC rationalizes that customers who believe they are treated
unfairly have the option of negotiating a fair rate or contracting with a
competing service.20 3
192. Id. at 237.
193. CAL. PUB. Urn.. CODE § 489 (West 1975 & Supp. 1995).
194. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 237-39.
195. CAL. PUB. Urn.. CODE § 453.
196. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
197. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988).
198. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 239.
199. Id.
200. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.12.4, at 116-17; see, e.g., MCI v. FCC, 917 F.2d
30 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (challenging AT&T's "Tariff 12" offerings).
201. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 439,448 (2d Cir. 1971). For an
analysis of the competitive necessity doctrine, see Alexander C. Larson et al., Competitive
Necessity and Pricing in Telecommunications Regulation, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1989).
202. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 239.
203. Id.
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2. Switched access
Switched access is a monopoly service provided by the LEC to
connect users to IXCs, and vice versa.21 As discussed earlier, access
charges may include switching, transport, and carrier common line
charges (CCLC) °205 The CPUC, however, has chosen to eliminate the
CCLC and offset the resulting loss of income through an increase in
other services, including basic exchange services3 °6 The CPUC's jus-
tification for this decision was that the CCLC was not a cost-based
charge, but was intended as a means of recovering nontraffic-sensitive
costs from toll users instead of basic users.20 7 The CPUC felt that the
CCLC conflicted with the philosophy of the new rate design, and that
toll users alone should not bear the burden of recovering these
CoStS
0 8
TURN disagrees with the CPUC's revenue-neutral philosophy
and considers toll users the parties responsible for supporting nontraf-
fic-sensitive costs. 20 9 Furthermore, TURN is opposed to any addi-
tional rise in basic service rates-the mechanism the CPUC chose to
offset the loss in CCLC revenue.210 Moreover, TURN considers the
elimination of the CCLC contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. ,211 which requires carriers to con-
tribute to local network costs.
2 2
CPUC Commissioner P. Gregory Conlon acknowledges that the
elimination of the CCLC would "'be a windfall for carriers at the ex-
pense of ratepayers.' "213 As an alternative, Conlon supports a re-
quirement that Pacific Bell and GTE pass along the effects of the
CCLC elimination to end users' toll rates.2 14 Moreover, he believes
that this choice departs from the CPUC's policy regarding imputation
of tariffed rates for monopoly services used by LECs.2 "
204. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
206. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 120-21.
207. Id. at 121.
208. 1&
209. Id. at 120.
210. Id. at 121.
211. 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
212. Memorandum, supra note 183, at 4.
213. California Proposes New IntraLATA Toll Competition Plan, TELECOMMUNICA-
TION S REP., July 25, 1994, at 12, 13 (quoting Commissioner Conlon).
214. Id.
215. This decision undermines the imputation safeguard and "'removes any assurance
that the LEC is not "charging itself" less than it charges its competitors for the same...
function.'" Id. (quoting Commissioner Conlon).
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3. Entrance to intraLATA market
Deregulation of the intraLATA toll market allows carriers other
than LECs to provide toll service.216 This decision requires that tele-
phone users have the ability to access a carrier other than their LEC.
Accessing a carrier other than the LEC can be done by either 1OXXX
dialing or presubscription.217 The CPUC chose not to employ toll call
presubscription.211 Instead, telephone users must dial a five-digit pre-
fix in order to request a carrier other than the LEC to carry the call.219
Without dialing the five-digit prefix, the call will be carried by the
LEC?
20
Other common carriers claim that 1OXXX dialing prevents them
from effectively competing in the market. 22' Customer awareness of
alternate carriers for toll traffic can be low.2 Even if a customer is
aware of alternate toll carriers, brand loyalty to the LEC may inhibit a
customer from using an alternate carrier.223 For instance, AT&T's
dominance of the long distance market was not significantly eroded by
competition until recently. 4
However, because the user must dial the 1OXXX access, inform-
ing and convincing telephone users to choose a carrier other than their
LEC is not enough. The 1OXXX requirement acts as a physical bar-
rier between the customer and the telephone company because it is
not as simple as dialing "1+" the phone'number. The access codes for
alternate carriers can be confusing and difficult to remember.21'
Moreover, the access code must be dialed before every call that the
telephone user wishes to have carried by an alternate carrier. As
such, competitive parity for accessibility between LECs and IXCs can
only be achieved with presubscription.
216. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 23, 335-36.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 159-63.
218. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 9. The CPUC left open the possibility of requir-
ing presubscription as a next step. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. See Helm, supra note 103, at D1.
222. Bill Burch, Competition Cuts Intra-LATA Toll Bills, NEToWRK WoRLD, Jan. 17,
1994, at 21, 21.
223. See Gillan, supra note 84, at 37-38.
224. Id. AT&T's market share is estimated to have dropped to 65% by 1994. AT&T
Sales Up 11% in '94, Best Since Breakup, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1995, at D2 [hereinafter
AT&T Sales].
225. For instance, LDDS's code is 10450; Bittel is 10867. WE'RE CHANGINo OUR
PRIcES, supra note 74, § 5.
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4. Basic rate service
The CPUC recognized that deregulating the intraLATA toll mar-
ket means that LECs will need the flexibility to charge competitive
rates z2 6 because fully competitive markets drive prices lower.227 Con-
sequently, the combination of lower prices and an eroding customer
base may also lead to a drop in LECs' revenue.228 To adhere to its
revenue-neutral policy, the CPUC offsets LECs' loss in income by al-
lowing price increases for other services.229 Furthermore, because
LECs provide basic service below DEC to further the penetration
goals set by the state,10 LECs subsidize residential basic service with
income derived from toll calls.231 LECs' proposed rate schedules at-
tempted to compensate for this loss in revenue. 32 The CPUC granted
some increase in the basic service rates, but not to the levels *requested
by Pacific Bell and GTE.
33
The adopted levels nevertheless exceeded rates proposed by
other parties to the decision.2-4 The Division of Ratepayer Advocates
(DRA) of the CPUC, for instance, proposed a rate structure for resi-
dential customers that was lower than that which the CPUC
adopted.235 Table 4 outlines the proposed and accepted rate designs.
The CPUC justified the rate increases by determining that the
alternative rate plans did not anticipate the competitive pressures
LECs will face in the next few years?3 6 Allowing the rate increases
will help maintain adequate revenues to "meet the costs of continuing
to provide monopoly services. 237
LECs are still concerned that the failure to secure the proposed
higher rates will undermine their ability to survive in an increasingly
competitive marketP38 However, the revenue-neutral approach to
setting rates results in a guarantee that LECs will never suffer any loss
226. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 32.
227. Id. at 33.
228. IdL at 32. However, the commission recognized that toll volume may increase and
offset some of this expected loss. Id.
229. See, e.g., id. at 38, 121.
230. Id. at 5.
231. See id. at 40, 45. For example, approximately 44% of GTE's revenues derive from
toll service. Id. at 40.
232. See id. at 40-43.
233. See id. at 40-49.
234. IM. at 47-48.
235. See id. at 43.
236. Id. at 48-49.
237. Id. at 10-11.
238. See id. at 40-43.
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Table 4- Basic Rate Comparison
--
mA -Prviu
Ui.
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of profit because of the decision to open the toll market to competi-
tion.239 Moreover, no competing telecommunication companies are
guaranteed protection from profit loss.240 The CPUC is without legal
support to implement the increase in basic residential rates simply to
offset potential revenue losses resulting from a competitive toll
market2
41
5. InterLATA service
The CPUC decision does not affect the restrictions on long dis-
tance carriage. Only long distance carriers are authorized to provide
interLATA services, and LECs are still prevented from competing in
this market.24 Consequently, because the LECs' monopoly is par-
tially eroded by competition in the intraLATA market, LECs argue
that they should be allowed to compete in providing long distance
services.
B. IntraLATA Deregulation in Other States
Most states allow some form of intraLATA competition, but such
competition is usually heavily restricted2 43 For instance, presubscrip-
tion is offered in only ten states.244 Virginia and Arizona are the only
states that have not yet adopted intraLATA toll competition.24 A
brief survey of how other states have approached intraLATA deregu-
lation follows.
1. Georgia
The Georgia Public Service Commission authorized intraLATA
toll competition in 1992.46 The Georgia Commission's decision did
not require presubscription and allowed LECs and IXCs to charge,
flexible rates. It did, however, require that the dominant LEC, South-
239. Memorandum, supra note 183, at 1.
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. American TeL & TeL Co., 552 F. Supp. at 227-28.
243. See Kristine Loosley, States Allow Intra-LATA Battle, Take Few Steps to Foster It,
TELCO Bus. REP., Nov. 8, 1993, at 1, 4-6.
244. The ten states are Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Montana, and Ohio. Eric Paulak, Intra-LATA Competition Brings Lower Rates,
NETwoRK WORLD, Aug. 15, 1994, at 31, 31; see infra text accompanying notes 248-55.
245. Paulak, supra note 244, at 31. Arizona, however, approved implementation of in-
traLATA competition with presubscription by July 1, 1996. Arizona Permits Local Ex-
change, IntraLATA Toll Competition, TELECOmMUNiCAT O NS REP., Dec. 26, 1994, at 9, 9.
246. IntraLATA Toll Competition, 131 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 205, 207 (Ga. P.S.C.
1992).
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em Bell, set toll rates that cover costs, including imputed access
charges to prevent an unfair competitive advantage.247
2. Florida
Competition for toll calls began in 1990241 despite objections
from LECs that intraLATA competition should be delayed until com-
petition was permitted in the interLATA market.2 4 9 The Florida Pub-
lie Service Commission declined to adopt presubscription for fear that
LECs would lose significant revenue.250 More recently, however, it
completed proceedings on implementing presubscription for
intraLATA toll traffic."' LECs took the position that presubscription
would result in IXCs having an unfair and insurmountable advantage
over LECs. 2 Furthermore, LECs argued that they would suffer
large market and revenue losses, with great harm coming to rural
users' telephone service.3 Supporters contend that presubscription
is in the public's interest and essential to a fully competitive market-
place.' 4 In the end, the Florida Commission ruled to implement
presubscription for toll calls in 1995.2-5
3. Kansas
IntraLATA toll competition without presubscription was author-
ized in Kansas in April 1993.6 Southwestern Bell Telephone op-
posed the competition based on three arguments. 25 7  First,
competition was not necessary because intraLATA users already re-
247. Mary Nagelhout, IntraLATA Competition: States Rethink the Ban, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., July 1, 1993, at 41, 41.
248. Investigation into Equal Access Exchange Areas, Toll Monopoly Areas, 1+ Re-
striction to the Local Exchange Companies and Elimination of the Access Discount, 116
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 473, 483 (Fla. P.S.C. 1990).
249. Nagelhout, supra note 247, at 41.
250. Id. GTE submitted information to the CPUC that 1OXXX dialing resulted in an
approximate loss of 6.4% of GTE's share of the switched toll market. IXCs Submit Plan
for IntraLATA EqualAccess in California, TELECOMMUNICAVTONS REP., Aug. 1, 1994, at 4,
4.
251. Investigation into IntraLATA Presubscription, No. 930330-TP, 1994 Fla. PUC
LEXIS 1125, at *3 (Fla. P.S.C. Sept. 7, 1994).
252. Id at *11.
253. Id at *9-15.
254. Id.
255. Audra D.S. Burch, Regional Toll Calls Could Get Cheaper, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 2,
1994, at 1A.
256. IntraLATA Competition, 143 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 542, 562-63 (Kan. Corp.
Comm'n 1993). The state previously rejected intraLATA competition in 1985 and again in
1989. Id. at 545.
257. Id. at 546; Nagelhout, supra note 247, at 41-42.
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ceive state-of-the-art communications services.258 Second, competi-
tion in the toll market would result in a revenue loss for the LEC of
up to $13 million.z 59 Third, precluding LECs from competing in the
interLATA market while allowing IXCs entry to the intraLATA mar-
ket was fundamentally unfair and would allow IXCs to achieve a pre-
ferred competitive position. 260,
The Kansas Commission rejected Southwestern Bell's arguments
but acknowledged that competition might affect basic rates, although
increases for basic local services were not an inescapable result of in-
traLATA toll competition 2 61 Moreover, the Kansas Commission
found that the goals of universal service would not be harmed by this
limited intraLATA competition.262 The Commission also ordered the
imputation of access charges to ensure that all network costs would be
recovered, as well as to prevent cross-subsidy and double recovery.263
4. Kentucky
The Kentucky Public Service Commission authorized intraLATA
toll competition, including "1+" presubscription and imputation of ac-
cess charges to LECs, in May 1991.21 The Kentucky Commission
stated that excluding presubscription would have merely been a short-
lived interim step, creating an artificial boundary that would increase
inefficiency. 65 Presubscription would also run counter to the Com-
mission's finding that competition was in the public interest, and
would not provide telecommunications carriers in the state with the
policy direction required to make investment decisions.2 66 The Ken-
tucky Commission decided that competition for intraLATA toll calls
258. IntraLATA Competition, 143 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 546; Nagelhout, supra
note 247, at 41-42.
259. IntraLATA Competition, 143 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 546; Nagelhout, supra
note 247, at 42.
260. IntraLATA Competition, 143 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 546; Nagelhout, supra
note 247, at 42.
261. Nagelhout, supra note 247, at 42.
262. Id.
263. IntraLATA Competition, 143 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 562-63.
264. IntraLATA Toll Competition, 122 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 565, 590 (Ky. P.S.C.
1991). The proceeding on whether to order presubscription, however, remains pending.
IntraLATA Equal Access Expected Early 1996 in Minnesota,; PUC Affirms "Bona Fide"
Request Rule, TELECOMMUMCATIONM S REP., Oct. 31, 1994, at 13, 13 [hereinafter In-
traLATA Equal Access].
265. Nagelhout, supra note 247, at 42.
266. Id.
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would not adversely affect local rates267 or jeopardize universal cover-
age because the competition was expected to gradually occur, and in-
creased demand with market stimulation would offset any potential
losses by the LEC.
26 1
5. Louisiana
The Louisiana Public Service Commission allowed competition
for intraLATA traffic in 1991.269 In addition to denying South Central
Bell Telephone's request to increase local rates in exchange for a re-
duction in toll charges, the Louisiana Commission ordered the LEC to
levy access charges against itself as it does against other carriers.270
Because of technological and networking limitations at the time, full
competition through presubscription was not implemented.2 71
6. Minnesota
The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission approved intraLATA
competition in March 1993.272 Although the Minnesota Commission
was committed to presubscription and considered it necessary for ef-
fective competition, it decided that it was too difficult to implement. 73
More recently, however, the Minnesota Commission ordered presub-
scription effective February 15, 1996.274 The Commission concluded
that presubscription would stimulate toll call usage and counterbal-
ance any potential revenue loss for LECs.275
267. Kentucky Commission Allows IntraLATA Toll Competition, PUB. UTL. FORT., July
1, 1991, at 49, 49.
268. Nagelhout, supra note 247, at 42.
269. Louisiana OKs IOXXX IntraLATA Toll Competition, PUB. UTL. FORT., Dec. 15,
1991, at 33, 33.
270. ld. South Central Bell has sought to avoid intraLATA competition by expanding
local calling areas which has "eliminate[d] intraLATA toll competition and replace[d] it
with local service in a forty mile radius." S. 1822, The Communications Act of 1994: Hear-
ings Before the Comm. on Coin., ScL, and Transp., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 428 (1994) (state-
ment of Bert C. Roberts, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, MCI
Communications Corp.). RBOCs have expanded local calling areas in Mississippi, New
Mexico, Texas, and Vermont, to name a few. Id.
271. Louisiana OKs IOXXX IntraLATA Toll Competition, supra note 269, at 33.
272. IntraLATA Toll Access Compensation, 142 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 218, 218
(Minn. P.U.C. 1993).
273. Nagelhout, supra note 247, at 42.
274. IntraLATA Equal Access, supra note 264, at 13.
275. Id. at 14.
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7. Missouri
In 1986 Missouri became the sixteenth state to allow intraLATA
toll competition.276 Missouri has four LATAs, three of which have
their own area code.277 The Missouri Public Service Commission de-
nied LECs the ability to change their basic rates but allowed them to
charge access fees.278 The Missouri Commission felt that LECs would
dominate because they were firmly entrenched in providing in-
traLATA service and insufficient business existed to allow for
competition.279
8. North Dakota
North Dakota allows intraLATA toll competition but initially did
not require presubscription?80 Subsequently, the North Dakota Pub-
lic Service Commission ordered all LECs to implement presubscrip-
tion as well as to impute access charges on themselves 81 US WEST,
the dominant LEC, argued that sufficient competition already existed
through 1OXXX dialing and that equal access is unfair because, as the
designated carrier, it is required to carry the call even if it is made at a
loss to it.2 a
The North Dakota Commission later ordered presubscription for
intraLATA calls throughout the state."83 However, this order was re-
versed'84 and blocked by the state assembly which passed legislation
that precluded requiring an LEC to provide 1+ dialing for intraLATA
calls until 1999.285
Two IXCs challenged the legislation as contrary to the state con-
stitution;286 however, the court upheld the legislation as "reasonable
... to allow the companies providing local exchange service to main-
tain a slightly more convenient dialing disparity requiring customers
desiring to use an interexchange carrier to dial an extra four-digit ac-
276. Semilof, supra note 48, at 11.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See Loosley, supra note 243, at 5.
281. Nagelhout, supra note 247, at 43.
282. Id.
283. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Heitkamp, 523 N.W.2d 548, 551 (N.D. 1994).
284. The reversal order resulted from a failure to comply with rule-making provisions.
Id.
285. Id.; Deregulation, Competition, Infrastructure Top '93 State Laws, ST. TELEPHONE
REG. REP., Dec. 30, 1993, at 1, 5.
286. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 523 N.W.2d at 551. The two IXCs were MCI and
LDDS. Id.
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cess code."' 'z 7 Furthermore, the court found a rational basis between
the substantial costs LECs would incur in order to implement 1+ dial-
ing and the state's interest in offering "'telecommunications services
at the most economic and reasonable cost.' ,,288
9. Ohio
Although the Ohio Public Utilities Commission opened in-
traLATA competition, an expansion of the market to include presub-
scription and equal access charges on a statewide basis was recently
declined. 8 9 The decision not to open the market to further competi-
tion was based on a failure by the petitioner to show that the current
regulations were unjust, discriminatory, or anticompetitive. 290 Never-
theless, the Ohio Commission approved intraLATA presubscription
for Western Reserve Telephone and Cincinnati Bell Telephone by the
end of 1994 and 1995, respectively.29'
C. Challenges to IntraLATA Deregulation
RBOCs and GTE oppose intraLATA competition because they
are precluded from competing for interLATA service.219 Other carri-
ers can counter charges of unfair competition, however, with the argu-
ment that each carrier "comes to the intraLATA market with an
advantage that is denied the other. '293 Furthermore, RBOCs have a
cost advantage over IXCs because they already have a highly efficient
operational toll network. The alternative carriers are optimized for
long-haul traffic and do not have the infrastructure within the various
LATAs.294 Moreover, the RBOCs and GTE retain an advantage be-
cause they still control the local loop, are the incumbent carriers and,
in most cases, are protected by 1OXXX dialing.2 95
287. Id at 554.
288. Id (quoting N.D. Cent. Code § 49-21-02.1 (Supp. 1993)).
289. Allnet Communications Serv. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 638 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ohio
1994).
290. Id
291. IntraLATA Equal Access, supra note 264, at 13.
292. See Gillan, supra note 84, at 36-37.
293. Id at 37.
294. Pam Powers, Intra-LATA Toll War Brewing: BOCs Prepare to Protect Hold on
Local Market, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 31, 1987, at 1, 1.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 216-25. "'[T]o be truly competitive,' dialing
parity is required." California Proposes New IntraLATA Toll Competition Plan, TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS RaP., July 25, 1994, at 12, 12 (quoting AT&T response to CPUC draft
decision).
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LECs argue that intraLATA competition will erode profits.296
However, "[s]o long as competitive entry erodes the [LEC's] market
at a rate slower than the market's growth, the [LEG] will continue to
see its revenues and traffic volumes increase. '' 9  In fact, the New
York Public Service Commission found the effects of intraLATA com-
petition on LECs to be "insignificant." 298 Washington state found
that after monitoring LECs' monthly revenue flow, "no adverse ef-
fects [were] reported." 99 AT&T reported that in states that allow in-
traLATA competition, it carried less than one percent of the
intraLATA residential calls.300 This scenario played out in the long
distance market after divestment and AT&T lost its market share to
competitors. °1
LECs argue that implementing presubscription is unnecessary be-
cause the market is sufficiently competitive with 1OXXX dialing.
302
However, even with presubscription, most consumers will stay with
the incumbent LEC as a carrier. For instance, in Iowa's voluntary
equal access plan, eighty percent of users signed on with US WEST,
the dominant LEC for the area.30 3 Therefore, it is unlikely that LECs
will experience losses substantial enough to jeopardize either their
revenues or their ability to provide local service.3"
296. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 32; Investigation into IntraLATA Presubscrip-
tion, No. 930330-TP, 1994 Fla. PUC LEXIS 1125, at *3, *11 (Fla. P.S.C. Sept. 7, 1994).
297. Gillan, supra note 84, at 37.
298. Paul Rodgers, InterLATA and IntraLATA Competition, in REGULATION AND DE-
RE ULATION AFiR THm AT&T Drwnsrrrum, at 471, 481 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3759, 1984).
299. Id.
300. AT&T estimated its share to be 0.94%. IXCs Submit Plan for IntraLATA Equal
Access in California, TELECOMmuNICATIONS REP., Aug. 1, 1994, at 4,44. By extrapolating
from AT&T's estimated 60% share of the interLATA market, the IXCs collectively have
an approximate nationwide residential intraLATA market share of 1.6%. Id
301. From the third quarter of 1984 to the end of 1987, AT&T's share of the inter-
state toll market declined from 84 percent to 70 percent. In every quarter, how-
ever, AT&T's traffic increased-by an average of more than 7 percent per year.
Furthermore, while AT&T's share of revenues has declined from 90 percent
to 75 percent-reflecting its loss in market share and significant rate reductions-
its revenues have remained relatively constant ....
Gillan, supra note 84, at 37-38 (footnotes omitted). Currently, AT&T carries approxi-
mately 60% of the long distance traffic in the United States. AT&T Sales, supra note 224,
at D2. AT&T's revenue in 1994, $5.7 billion, reached the same revenue as the entire Bell
system attained just prior to its breakup in 1984. Id
302. See, e.g., Intra-Market Service Area Dialing Arrangements, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(FUR) 223, 224-25 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1990).
303. Gillan, supra note 84, at 38.
304. Id.
1487
1488 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Once presubscription is ordered, LECs may argue that they will
suffer dramatic losses in revenue and market share,305 just as GTE
and Pacific Bell claimed they will suffer from limited intraLATA com-
petition in California. 06 LECs believe they should be compensated
for this loss in order to continue to provide affordable basic phone
service. This compensation will likely derive from a rise in local
rates.3 °7
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Business Customers Win Out
Although California's new rates will be among the lowest in the
country, business customers are primarily those who will see lower
overall phone costs. 30 8 The CPUC admits that more than half of resi-
dential customers will see higher phone bills. 30 9 Higher basic service
rates will hurt the poor, the elderly, and those twenty to thirty percent
of phone customers who do not make toll calls every month.310 More-
over, business customers will have the added ability to bypass the
standard tariff rates and negotiate better deals for their toll calls. 311
Additionally, Pacific Bell will only target the largest users to secure
contract deals.312 In New Jersey, Bell Atlantic offers its Toll Savings
Plan only to customers who pledge at least $150,000 per year in total
volume.313
Even without presubscription, sophisticated customers with PBX
software can automatically route their calls to their chosen carrier and
therefore enjoy an immediate benefit from competition. 4 Further-
more, if the customer uses an IXC as its toll carrier, the customer may
305. LECs have asserted that they will suffer losses from implementing the technology
required for presubscription. See Investigation into IntraLATA Presubscription, 1994 Fla.
PUC LEXIS 1125, at *3, *41-45.
306. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 163.
307. See id at 38; Investigation into IntraLATA Presubscription, 1994 Fla. PUC LEXIS
1125, at *3, *41-45.
308. See Bill Burch, California Intra-LATA Toll Rates Cut Nearly in Half, NETWoRK
WORLD, Sept. 26, 1994, at 31, 31.
309. The PUC Gets Its Wires Crossed- Effort to Deregulate Phone Service Business Has
Become One Big Snarl, L.A. TuMEs, Jan. 5, 1995, at B6 (editorial).
310. Id
311. See Burch, supra note 308, at 31.
312. Pac Bell Gearing Up for Intra-LATA Competition, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ALERT,
Nov. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, CMPCOM Library, ZTL2 File.
313. Paulak, supra note 244, at 31.
314. David Rohde, Intra-LATA Toll Calls: Trick or Treat?, NETWORK WORLD, Nov. 1,
1993, at 28, 28. The FCC noted that business customers may have choices that residential
customers cannot exercise and, therefore, residential ratepayers will pay a disproportionate
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likely receive additional savings because the intraLATA toll usage
may apply toward IXC volume discounts.315
B. Recommendations
"[R]egulatory rules which govern the basic structure of competi-
tion should begin with the assignment of most rights to the cus-
tomer. 31 6 One analyst suggested that this objective is met through
two elements: dialing pattern reform and financial indifference.31 7
1. Dialing patterns
States should implement presubscription as soon as possible.318
Access codes add a barrier to consumer access of alternate carriers,
thus insulating the LEC from competition and limiting the choice and
benefit of a deregulated market.319 Presubscription is recognized as
an accepted and superior method for accessing competitive carri-
ers32 0-long distance calling could not be easier. Presubscription em-
powers the user with freedom and flexibility in the selection of
telecommunications products.21 It also allows other carriers to com-
pete against LECs on a level playing field, thus increasing com-
petition.
Likewise, implementing presubscription should not be condi-
tioned on allowing LECs to compete in markets in which they are
currently prohibited. LECs will offer dialing parity in exchange for
permission to carry interLATA calls.3 1 Because such approval will
not be effective for some time,32 and because unfair competition con-
tinues to exist in the interim, 1+ dialing should not wait for LEC entry
into other markets.
Furthermore, presubscription should be extended to residential
customers before business customers. This method gradually in-
higher price for toll calls. Administration of the North American Numbering Plan, 9 FCC
Rcd 2068, 2077 (1994).
315. Rohde, supra note 314, at 28.
316. Gillan, supra note 84, at 35.
317. Id.
318. Even with an authorization to implement presubscription, LECs may not be re-
quired to implement the change for anywhere between six months to five years. See Inves-
tigation into IntraLATA Presubscription, No. 930330-TP, 1994 Fla. PUC LEXIS 1125, at
*3, *30-33 (Fla. P.S.C. Sept. 7, 1994).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 215-25.
320. See Gillan, supra note 84, at 35.
321. Id.
322. InterLATA Relief, supra note 128, at 9.
323. See id.; Sparks Fly over Industry Talks on InterLATA Services; Paper Outlines "Es-
sential Elements" of Local Competition, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., Feb. 13,1995, at 1, 1.
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troduces competition and provides regulators with quantifiable expe-
rience before introducing full-scale competition.32 n It also bypasses
problems of competitors who engage in cream skimming of business
customers who comprise the bulk of the toll market. Lastly, residen-
tial customers are more in need of presubscription than business
customers. Business customers are more likely to use PBX program-
ming, smart phones, and auto dialers. They are, therefore, less likely
to turn to 1+ dialing to take advantage of the benefits of alternative
carriers. 325
2. Financial indifference
Regulators should not sacrifice consumer choice and competition
in exchange for a carrier's financial protection. The CPUC should ap-
proach deregulation issues without regard to the market participants'
estimated financial outcome. By implementing a revenue-neutral pol-
icy, the CPUC has chosen to protect the financial viability of LECs at
the consumer's expense. If there is a legitimate concern as to the abil-
ity of a carrier to provide a government-mandated service, the CPUC
should look to other competitors who use that carrier's service rather
than making consumers directly and immediately bear the burden of
lost income.
a. access charges
In the event increased competition does cause LECs to suffer sig-
nificant financial losses that threaten affordable basic rates and uni-
versal service, regulators should look to subsidization from other
markets where LECs retain monopoly power.326 Access charges are
one area of almost exclusive LEC control. As long as LECs control
access to carriers for toll or long distance calls, LECs can charge these
carriers an access fee.327 This charge is a single transaction common
to all calls outside the local loop and should be the source of any local
service subsidization.
The use of access charges has four advantages. First, regulators
control the degree these charges contribute to local service.328 Regu-
latory control is based on an explicit policy decision by the regulator
and should avoid decisions based on LECs' financial objectives.329
324. Gillan, supra note 84, at 39.
325. Id. at 39 n.14.
326. Id. at 36.
327. See id.
328. Id.
329. Id
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Second, the side effects of competition are limited to that single mar-
ket.330 Third, access charges are not threatened by erosion of compe-
tition in the market331 -LECs' dominance in this service will not be
undermined except by specific determination by the regulator.
Fourth, local rates stay at low levels, thus promoting the goals of uni-
versal service.
Furthermore, these access charges should be applied evenly to all
carriers, including to LECs themselves. LECs' failure to levy the
same access charges against themselves as they levy against IXCs may
give rise to a charge of price discrimination, thus violating state and
federal law.332 Imputation of access charges to LECs also prevents
bypass of the local exchange by consumers who utilize private net-
works, and encourages efficient use of the toll facilities. 333
b. local rates
The CPUC should not raise the rates for basic service. Rate in-
creases threaten the universal service goals set out by the CPUC.
Also, evidence of any potential loss is based on economic models and
is to some degree speculative. Other states have taken a wait-and-see
approach before enacting any raise in basic service rates. The CPUC
should have chosen this more cautious approach to shield consumers.
C. Sign of Future Trends
The local long distance market in California will change from mo-
nopolistic to competitive. Initiating competition removes the CPUC
from a price regulation role while simultaneously allowing LECs and
IXCs more freedom to compete in a deregulated market. The CPUC
has taken the step of allowing market forces to establish the price in
one portion of the telephone market. However, the manner the
CPUC employed has sacrificed the interests of residential customers
for the goal of competition. The CPUC has simultaneously under-
mined the tantamount goals of universal service set out by the federal
and state government.
Each of the decisions may provoke litigation over anything from
the basic service increase, to the common carrier line charge, to the
toll rate structure. However, as these issues are addressed, the tele-
330. Id
331. Id.
332. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1988); CAL. PUB. UrnL. CODE §§ 556, 558 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1995); Dingwall, supra note 65, at 443-46.
333. Dingwall, supra note 65, at 441-43.
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communications markets will become increasingly competitive, both
at the state and national levels.
In 1991 the National Telecommunication and Information Ad-
ministration concluded that the public interest would be best served
by removing legal barriers to competitive entry of the local exchange
services." The CPUC has stated that it intends to open all telecom-
munications markets to full competition by 1997.7 Consumers have
much at stake in this matter because of the continued reliance on tele-
communication services for social and economic welfare. The devel-
opment of a national information infrastructure promises benefits that
consumers will increasingly begin to rely upon. Telecommunications
companies will also have much at stake in the development of new
markets, such as video dial tone, and increasing competition in ex-
isting markets, such as the local loop.336
The rulings enacted by the CPUC are critical to setting precedent
for further deregulation in these emerging and existing areas. With-
out adjustments in its approach, the CPUC decisions reflect a trend
that ultimately will adversely affect consumers in the future and result
in excluding portions of the population from the benefits of a commu-
nications infrastructure.
So while Express Tel's ad may be correct in saying that Pacific
Bell has been taking us to the cleaners, the CPUC is the one driving us
there.
Peter Siembab *
334. Lori A. Burkhart, Local Telephone Monopoly-The Beginning of the End, Pun.
UTm. FORT., Feb. 1, 1992, at 32, 32 (citing NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFOR-
MATION ADMINISTRATION REP., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION
271-72).
335. Interim Opinion, supra note 7, at 23-24 (citing CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, ENHANC-
ING CALIFORNIA'S COMPETITIVE STRENGTH: A STRATEGY FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUcrURE (1993)). However, "most state utilities commissions [will] overlook dial-
ing parity for intra[ ]LATA toll calls as much less important than the question of opening
the local loop." Loosley, supra note 243, at 7.
336. Nationally, the local exchange market is estimated at $80 billion, the cable market
at $20 billion, the toll market at $14 billion, and the long distance market at $60 billion.
Leslie Helm, Telecom Regulation: A Status Report, L.A. TMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at D1.
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V. GLOSSARY
1OXXX DIALING: Dialing method for designating IXC. Each IXC
has a unique three-digit code which is represented by XXX.
AT&T: American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.
CCLC: Carrier Common Line Charge. The costs levied against carri-
ers for accessing the LEC's network-the nontraffic-sensitive costs of
the local loop, end office, and other like portions of the LEC's
network.
CPUC: California Public Utilities Commission.
DEC: Direct Embedded Costs. The historical costs that can be attrib-
uted to a specific service supplied by a utility.
DRA: Division of Rolepayer Advocates of the CPUC.
INTERCONNECTING TELEPHONE EXCHANGE: A central office tele-
phone switch that is connected to another central office telephone
switch.
INTERLATA PHONE CALLS: Phone calls that pass from LATA to
LATA. RBOCs are prohibited from offering this service pursuant to
the MFJ.
IrTRALATA PHONE CALLS: Phone calls that originate and terminate
within the same LATA.
IXC: Inter-Exchange Carrier. Carriers that provide interLATA com-
munications services over their own or leased facilities. Commonly
referred to as a long-distance carrier.
LATA: Local Access and Transport Areas. Geographic service areas
established by order of the MFJ that mark the boundaries beyond
which the RBOCs may not carry telephone calls.
LEC: Local Exchange Carrier. Provider of local and intraLATA tele-
phone service. Includes all RBOCs.
LOCAL Loop: The two wires between the telephone user and the
LEC's end office.
MFJ: Modified Final Judgment. United States v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The agreement between AT&T
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and the Department of Justice that required AT&T to divest itself of
exchange telecommunications services.
POP: Point of Presence. The physical location of the IXC's switching
office that gains access to the LEC's network.
PRESUBSCRImrION: Method of allowing a telephone subscriber to des-
ignate in advance which carrier will transport all of a class of phone
calls.
RBOC: Regional Bell Operating Company. Twenty-two independ-
ent, regional holding companies that provide for all calls carried over
the local exchange.
TOLL CALL: Generally, any intraLATA call beyond a twelve-mile
radius.
TURN: Toward Utility Rate Normalization. California-based con-
sumer rights organization.
